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ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS AND THE
DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT:
ARE COPYRIGHT OWNERS ADEQUATELY
PROTECTED?
Brandon K. Murai*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is a worldwide system of interconnected
computers that allows people around the world to communi-
cate and exchange information with one another.1 In 1996,
approximately 40 million people worldwide used the Internet
and by 1999, 200 million people were expected to use the
Internet.2
With this technological communication advance comes
the danger that people will use this technology to infringe
upon the intellectual property rights of others.' A copyright is
governed by federal law and generally protects the form of
expression of ideas in words, pictures, sounds, etc.,4 but it
* Comments Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 40. J.D. candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; B.S., University of California, Davis.
1. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
2. See id. at 850
3. See 144 CONG. REC. H7092 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Frank).
4. A copyright protects:
[O]riginal works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following cate-
gories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
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does not protect the ideas behind the form of the expression.'
Over the Internet, people can exchange words, sounds, pic-
tures, and video clips,6 which sometimes violates a copyright
holder's exclusive right to control the form of the expression
under the Copyright Act.7
Changes to the copyright law were required to adapt the
existing law to the problems posed by the Internet.8 The
courts have slowly applied existing legal theories and princi-
ples to the modern technology. However, many areas of the
Copyright Act have not been applied to the Internet due to
the rapid changes in technology and because they needed
clarification.
On October 28, 1998, Congress passed the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"). 9 Because the DMCA would
update the Copyright Act to define the copyright infringe-
ment liability of online service providers, ° Representative
Howard Coble stated that the DMCA was "the most compre-
hensive copyright bill since 1976."" The DMCA also incorpo-
(8) architectural works.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1996).
5. A copyright does not protect "an original work of authorship extended to
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work." Id. § 102(b).
6. Reno, 521 U.S at 851.
7. Under the Copyright Act, the holder of a copyright, or his or her agent
has the "exclusive rights to do and to authorize" another:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to per-
form the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovis-
ual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1996).
8. See 144 CONG. REC. S11889 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
9. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998).
10. See 144 CONG. REc. S11888 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (Statement of Sen.
Thurmond).
11. 144 CONG. REC. H10615 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (Statement of Rep. Co-
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rates two international treaties: the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization Copyright Treaty and the Performances
and Phonograms Treaty." By incorporating the treaties, the
DMCA would "ensure adequate protection for American
works in countries around the world in the digital age.""3
Title II of the DMCA is designed to help clarify the li-
ability of online service providers ("OSPs") and Internet serv-
ice providers ("ISPs"),' 4 such as America Online and Netcom,
for copyright-infringing materials placed on their computer
networks or to which their network provides access. 5 The
DMCA clarifies and limits the liability of OSPs who grant ac-
cess to the Internet and the World Wide Web for copyright in-
fringement under certain circumstances. 6 Under current
case law, an OSP cannot be held directly liable for copyright
infringement when the OSP's system is merely a conduit for
the spread of copyright-infringing materials. 7 However, an
ble).
12. Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 102.
13. 144 CONG. REC. H10615 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (Statement of Rep. Co-
ble). The two treaties were designed to "mak[e] it unlawful to defeat technologi-
cal protections used by copyright owners to protect their works, including pre-
venting unlawful access and targeting devices made to circumvent encrypted
material" and "makes it unlawful to deliberately alter or delete information
provided by a copyright owner which identifies a work, its owner and its per-
missible uses." Id.
14. A "service provider" is defined in the statute as follows:
(A) As used in subsection (a), the term "service provider" means an en-
tity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for
digital online communications, between or among points specified by a
user, of material of the user's choosing, without modification to the con-
tent of the material sent or received.
(B) As used in this section, other than subsection (a), the term "service
provider" means a provider of online services or network access, or the
operator of facilities therefor, and includes an entity described in sub-
paragraph (A).
17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A)-(B) (1998). While this comment refers to OSPs
throughout, it is intended to cover the more commonly used term, Internet
Service Providers (ISPs), as well.
15. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 105-796, at 64 (1998).
16. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 202 (adopting 17 U.S.C. § 512).
17. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D.
Tex. 1997); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503
(N.D. Ohio 1997); Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs.,
983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). See also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Sanfillipo, 46
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1350 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 1998) (holding that a web site pro-
vider was guilty of derivative copyright infringement without making a specific
finding of direct, contributory, or vicarious liability).
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OSP can be held liable for contributory or vicarious copyright
infringement liability.'" The decision to grant OSPs limited
protection from direct, contributory, or vicarious copyright in-
fringement liability under certain circumstances was the re-
sult of a two-year congressional effort to define the limits of
OSP liability when the copyright infringement is caused by a
third party.'" Congress attempted to balance the interest of
providing affordable Internet access against the continued
expression of ideas.0
In balancing these opposing interests, OSPs, copyright
holders, and members of Congress came to an agreement re-
garding the circumstances in which OSPs would receive lim-
ited protection from copyright infringement liability.2' By
granting OSPs limited protection from copyright infringe-
ment liability caused by third parties, one question remains:
in light of the previous case law, are the rights of copyright
holders adequately protected?
This comment examines whether the rights of copyright
owners are adequately protected under the DMCA when
OSPs are granted limited protection from liability for a third
party's infringing activities and whether further legislation is
required to protect the copyright holder's rights. First, this
comment examines case law, beginning with Religious Tech-
nology Center v. Netcom,22 the first case extensively analyzing
OSP liability for a third party's copyright-infringing actions.
It then examines the relevant portions of the DMCA,24 specifi-
cally 17 U.S.C. § 512,5 regarding liability of OSPs for a third
party's copyright-infringing actions. 26  Next, this comment
compares the DMCA and case law, using a hypothetical situa-
tion in which a third party uses an OSP's services to spread
18. See Webbworld, 991 F. Supp. at 553-54; Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. at
514.
19. See 144 CONG. REc. H10620 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep
Goodlatte).
20. See 144 CONG. REC. H7092 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Frank).
21. See 144 CONG. REC. H10620 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep
Goodlatte).
22. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1361.
23. See infra Part II.A.
24. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202, 112 Stat.
2860, 2877-86 (1998).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (1998).
26. See infra Part II.B.
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its copyright-infringing messages, in order to determine the
OSP's liability and the copyright holder's rights in such a
situation." Finally, based upon the copyright holder's rights
under both the common law and the DMCA, this comment
suggests that additional legislation is not required to properly
protect the rights of a copyright holder. 8
II. BACKGROUND
A. Case Law Regarding Liability of Online Service Providers
1. Religious Technology Center v. Netcom
The first case to address OSP liability for a third party's
infringing activities was Religious Technology Center v. Net-29 ta
com. In that case, Dennis Erlich, a former minister of the
Church of Scientology, released secret copyrighted works
owned by the Religious Technology Center ("RTC")" on an
Internet newsgroup.3' L. Ron Hubbard, the late founder of
the Church of Scientology, had written the copyrighted mate-
rials.32 Erlich released portions of the copyrighted works by
copying them into messages that he wrote criticizing the
Church of Scientology, which he then uploaded33 to a bulletin
board service ("BBS")34 run by Thomas Klemesrud. 3" Klemes-
27. See infra Part III.
28. See infra Part IV.
29. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
30. See id. at 1365-66.
31. The Webbworld court explained:
A newsgroup is an Internet forum for the exchange of ideas by people of
similar interests. Newsgroups exist on the Usenet, which like the
World Wide Web is an aspect of the Internet. A newsgroup typically
specializes in a certain subject area .... Newsgroups feature discrete
collections of information called "articles." Newsgroup participants
may "post" (upload) articles, which consist of text and/or images....
Once online and within a newsgroup, a participant may post an article,
may view one of many articles on the computer screen, and may down-
load an article to his or her computer for later retrieval or printing.
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 549 (N.D. Tex.
1997).
32. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1365.
33. "The process of transferring the image from one's personal computer to
the bulletin board is known as uploading." Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839
F. Supp. 1552, 1554 n.3 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
34. A "bulletin board service" is:
[E]lectronic storage media, such as computer memories or hard disks,
which is attached to telephone lines via modem devices, and controlled
1999] 289
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rud's BBS did not have its own connection to the Internet and
relied on Netcom Online Communications, Inc. ("Netcom") to
connect to the Internet, storing the materials on Netcom's
computer system. 6 RTC notified Netcom of the infringing
materials posted on its system and asked Netcom to prevent
Erlich from gaining Internet access through its system.37
However, Netcom refused to grant RTC's request, claiming
that it is impossible to pre-screen a subscriber's message and
that to deny Erlich access would mean denying access to all
the other users of Kiemesrud's BBS. 8
Erlich posted the infringing materials on the Internet
newsgroup through an automatic process. 39 He transmitted
the materials from his home computer using a telephone and
a modem to connect to Kiemesrud's BBS. 0 The infringing
messages, through an automatic process, were temporarily
stored in Klemesrud's computer memory.4 Then Netcom
software automatically copied the infringing messages onto
Netcom's own computers.42 Once saved on the Netcom com-
puter, the infringing messages would be available to any of
Netcom's customers, as well as other members of the news-
group to which Erlich posted his messages.43 The infringing
messages were stored for short periods of time: three days on
Klemesrud's BBS and eleven days on Netcom's system.44
RTC sued Netcom for derivative copyright infringement,
claiming Netcom spread Erlich's infringing materials.45 In its
by a computer.... Third parties, known as "users," of electronic bulle-
tin boards can transfer information over the telephone lines from their
own computers to the storage medium on the bulletin board by a proc-
ess known as "uploading." Uploaded information is thereby recorded
on the storage media. Third party users also can retrieve information
from the electronic bulletin board by a process known as "download-
ing."
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 683 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
("MAPHIA 1") (citation omitted).
35. See Neteom, 907 F. Supp. at 1366.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 1367.
41. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1367.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 1367-68.
44. See id. at 1367.
45. See id. at 1366.
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suit, RTC argued direct, contributory, and vicarious copyright
infringement theories."
In order to prove a copyright violation, the plaintiff must
establish ownership of a valid copyright.47 A copyright creates
a rebuttable presumption of validity when the holder receives
a registration certificate from the Copyright Office.48 The
Netcom court held that RTC established the rebuttable pre-
sumption of a valid copyright.49
The plaintiff also needs to establish that the alleged in-
fringer made a copy of a protected form of expression." In or-
der to show that the Netcom program copied Erlich's infring-
ing message and RTC's protected materials onto the Netcom
computer system, the court relied upon MAI Systems Corp. v.
Peak Computer, Inc.5 In MA! Systems, the Ninth Circuit held
that a computer repair person, who was not authorized to use
the licensed program, committed direct copyright infringe-
ment when the computer was briefly turned on to load the
program into the Random Access Memory ("RAM") to check
an "error log."" The MAI Systems court ruled that there was
a copyright violation because, by turning on the computer, the
program was copied into RAM and the copy was stable long
enough to be perceived.53
A copy is created on a computer system when it is "suffi-
ciently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, re-
produced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more
than transitory duration."4 The copy must also be "fixed in
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later de-
veloped, from which [it] can be perceived, reproduced, or oth-
erwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a ma-
chine or device."5 The Netcom court held that a "copy" of
RTC's copyrighted material was created on Netcom's com-
puter system.56
46. See id. at 1366-77.
47. See Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 423 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 954 (1987).
48. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1996).
49. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1367.
50. See Baxter, 812 F.2d at 423.
51. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
52. Id. at 518-19.
53. See id. at 518.
54. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1996).
55. Id. § 101.
56. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368 (N.D. Cal.
1999]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
a. Direct Copyright Infringement
To prove direct copyright infringement, a copyright
holder must show that the alleged infringer violated one of
the exclusive rights of a copyright holder." Under the 1976
Copyright Act, there is no intent requirement for a direct
copyright infringement to take place." However, the Netcom
court held that there must be some volitional aspect, and
found that Netcom did not consciously cause the copying to
take place." The court compared the situation to a copy ma-
chine owner who allows the public to use the copier, which is
then used by a third party to make infringing copies. °
In holding that some volitional action is required for di-
rect copyright infringement liability, the court declined to
follow other district courts, which often found direct copyright
infringement for operators of BBSs.6" In Playboy Enterprises,
Inc. v. Frena,62 subscribers to a BBS operated by Frena posted
copyrighted pictures owned by Playboy Enterprises, Inc.
("Playboy"). 63 Frena, once notified of the copyright violations,
began to monitor the BBS to make sure that no other in-
fringing materials appeared on his BBS. 4 The Frena court
nonetheless held that a violation of Playboy's public distribu-
tion and display rights occurred when the BBS subscribers
uploaded and downloaded65 the infringing pictures. In addi-
tion, the Frena court held that although Frena might have
been unaware of the presence of the copyright-infringing im-
ages, there is no intent or knowledge requirement for copy-
right infringement. The Netcom court refused to follow
Frena's holding because the Frena court did not take into ac-
1995).
57. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1996).
58. See id. § 504(c).
59. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368-70.
60. See id. at 1369.
61. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
("MAPHIA F'); Playboy Enteprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla.
1993).
62. Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1554.
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. "The process of transferring the image from the bulletin board to one's
personal computer is known as downloading." Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1554 n.1.
66. See Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1556-57.
67. See id. at 1559 (citing D.C. Comics Inc. v. Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29
(2nd Cir. 1990)).
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count the fact that the defendant did not create the copies on
its computer, i.e., the copies were created by a subscriber and
not by the defendant.68
In Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA,69 a BBS allowed
subscribers to upload and download copyrighted video games
owned by Sega Enterprises."° Subscribers were encouraged
by the defendant to upload video games in exchange for the
subscriber's ability to download other video games from the
BBS.7' The District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia held that Sega Enterprises showed a prima facie case
of direct copyright infringement because MAPHIA created
copies of the video games when Sega's programs were up-
loaded to the BBS with the defendant's knowledge. 2 The
Netcom court also declined to follow this holding because it
believed that the finding by the Sega court regarding direct
copyright infringement was "entirely conclusory."73 The Net-
com court further found that the Sega court may have con-
fused the direct infringement requirements with contributory
copyright infringement requirements.74
According to the Netcom court, a direct infringement the-
ory without a volitional action requirement, "would create
many separate acts of infringement and, carried to its natural
extreme, would lead to unreasonable liability"'" because any
computer that copied and disseminated the infringing mes-
sage would be liable for direct infringement.6 "Although
copyright is a strict liability statute, there should still be
some element of volition or causation which is lacking where
68. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370-71 (N.D.
Cal. 1995).
69. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
("MAPHIA 1"). Note that the district court in the later Sega Enters. Ltd. v.
MAPHIA ("MAPHIA IF), 948 F.Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996), distinguished the
preliminary injunction holding in MAPHIA I, stating that it did not make a con-
clusion of law that the defendant was guilty of direct copyright infringement
and followed Netcom in requiring some volitional action. See also Sega Enters.
Ltd. v. Sabella, 1996 WL 780560 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1996) (holding by the same
district court judge as MAPHIA I that some volitional action was required to
show direct copyright infringement by the BBS on a similar set of facts).
70. See MAPHIA 1, 857 F. Supp. at 687.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 686.
73. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1371.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 1369.
76. See id. at 1368-70.
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a defendant's system is merely used to make a copy by a third
party."" The Netcom court read in a volition requirement be-
cause the copies were made automatically, with no action
taken directly by the OSP.78
The Netcom court also held that Netcom did not violate
RTC's exclusive right of "public distribution and display."79
Netcom only temporarily stored the copies of the infringing
works on its computer system and did not control the con-
tent of the material placed onto its system.8' The court held
that Netcom's act of merely providing a connection to the
Internet through which Erlich spread the infringing materi-
als did not violate the copyright holder's exclusive rights. 2
The court held that to allow such liability "would involve an
unreasonably broad construction of public distribution and
display rights.""
In summary, the Netcom court held that Netcom was not
liable for direct copyright infringement merely because an in-
fringing copy was created on Netcom's computer system with
no volitional action by Netcom. Furthermore, the court did
not find that Netcom violated RTC's exclusive rights under
the Copyright Act because Netcom did not control the materi-
als placed onto its system and only temporarily stored those
materials.85 Since Netcom merely acted as a "conduit" by
which Erlich's material was able to reach the Internet, no li-
ability resulted.86
77. Id. at 1370.
78. See id. at 1368-70.
79. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1371-72.
80. In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, the court held that the public dis-
tribution and display rights of Playboy were infringed when copyrighted pic-
tures owned by Playboy were made available for downloading from Frena's
BBS. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556-57 (M.D. Fla.
1993). The Netcom court distinguished this case because Netcom did not store
the infringing materials on its computer system as an archive for its members,
thereby "supplying a product" for its members, but served as an access point
through which the infringing materials were able to be placed on the Internet.
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372.
81. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 1368-71.
85. See id. at 1372.
86. See id.
[Vol. 40294
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b. Contributory Copyright Infringement
Although the court found no direct copyright infringe-
ment, it held that Netcom could still be liable for contributory
copyright infringement.87 To demonstrate contributory copy-
right infringement, a plaintiff must show a defendant's
knowledge of the infringing activity.88 RTC argued Netcom
met this requirement when RTC notified Netcom of the in-
fringing materials, but Netcom refused to take action. '9 Net-
com argued that it had no way of knowing whether the mate-
rials were truly infringing.' ° The court held that,
[w]here a BBS operator cannot reasonably verify a claim
of infringement, either because of a possible fair use de-
fense, the lack of copyright notices on the copies, or the
copyright holder's failure to provide the necessary docu-
mentation to show that there is a likely infringement, the
operator's lack of knowledge will be found reasonable and
there will be no liability for contributory infringement for
allowing the continued distribution of the works on its
system.9'
The court held that questions of fact regarding Netcom's
knowledge of the infringing activity remained and hence re-
fused to grant summary judgment.92
In addition to the knowledge requirement, the plaintiff
must also demonstrate substantial participation by the de-
fendant in furthering the spread of the infringing materials.93
The court found the second requirement is met when the OSP
knows, or has reason to know, of infringing materials and the
materials remain on the OSP's system after knowledge is ac-
quired.94
c. Vicarious Copyright Infringement
The Netcom court also held that an OSP could be vicari-
ously liable for copyright infringement.95 For vicarious liabil-
ity, the OSP must have the "right and ability to control" the
87. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373-75.
88. See id. at 1373.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 1373-74.
91. Id. at 1374.
92. See id. at 1374-75.
93. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
94. See Id.
95. See id. at 1375-77.
1999] 295
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
infringing activities.96 In addition, a copyright holder must
demonstrate that an OSP has the "right and the ability to su-
pervise the conduct of its subscribers."97 RTC argued that
Netcom had the ability to control its subscriber's infringing
messages because Netcom reserved the right to take remedial
action against subscribers in its terms and conditions.9" All
subscribers must agree to terms and conditions of service
when signing up for Netcom's service.99 The technology is
available for Netcom to delete specific postings, so Netcom
could have taken action to remove the infringing postings.9 '
In addition, to demonstrate vicarious copyright infringe-
ment the copyright holder must prove that the alleged in-
fringer obtains a "direct financial benefit" from the infringing
materials.101 The court held that receiving a fee for Internet
service is insufficient evidence of a direct financial benefit.
0 2
The court further held that for a "direct financial benefit" to
exist the OSP must receive some financial benefit from the in-
fringing materials, e.g., an enhanced value for the service or
the ability to attract new subscribers due to the presence of
the infringing material on its computer system.0 3 Although
the court found that Netcom's actions met the "right and
ability to control" element, the court found no vicarious copy-
right liability because Netcom did not obtain a direct finan-
cial benefit from the infringing materials.
2. Case Law Since Netcom
Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Association of Fire Equip-
ment Distributors°5 followed the Netcom holding. In Marobie,
the owner of a clip art software program,1°' Marobie-FL,
brought suit against Northwest Nexus ("Northwest"), a World
96. Id. at 1375.
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375-76.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 1376.
102. See id. at 1377.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 1376-77.
105. Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F. Supp.
1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
106. "Computer clip art consists of ready-made disks of black and white or
color line art drawings that a computer user can display on his computer and
use as artwork." Id. at 1171.
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Wide Web'. service provider, because portions of copyrighted
software were available on a web page0 8 located on North-
west's computer system.0 9 Marobie-FL argued that North-
west was guilty of copyright infringement because Northwest
stored the infringing materials on its system, provided access
to the infringing materials via the web page, and allowed
copies of the infringing materials to be made."0
The Marobie court held that Northwest was not guilty of
direct copyright infringement because it did not engage in in-
fringing activity itself.1 " Rather, Northwest "only provided
the means to copy, distribute or display plaintiffs works,
much like the owner of a public copying machine used by a
third party to copy protected material.""2  In addition, the
Marobie court held that Northwest was not guilty of vicarious
copyright infringement."3 Northwest did not financially bene-
fit from the posted infringing materials since it merely re-
ceived a one-time setup fee and a flat quarterly fee for the
service."' Without any additional financial benefit due to the
presence of the infringing materials, no liability was shown."'
The court reserved judgement for contributory infringement
because it was unclear whether Northwest had knowledge of
the infringing materials, or had the ability to control the con-
tents of what was placed on the web page."6
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc.,11
the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio distin-
guished the Netcom decision. In Hardenburgh, the defendant
owned a BBS where subscribers could access and download
107. "The World Wide Web ('the Web') or the Internet is a network of inter-
connected computers linked by communication lines that allows persons with
the appropriate software to access other computers with their local computer
through the use of a modem." Id.
108. "A Web Page is a collection of electronic documents which may include
text, graphics, sound, or video. A Web Page may enable the user to place infor-
mation on the Web Page or to receive information from the Web Page." Id.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 1176-79.
111. See Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F.
Supp. 1167, 1178 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
112. Id.
113. See id. at 1179.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 1178-79.
117. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D.
Ohio 1997).
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materials unavailable to other members of the public."8 In
addition to access to the restricted files, the BBS provided
other services such as e-mail, chat rooms, advertisements,
"computer technical assistance," and even a dating service."'
The files available for downloading by subscribers in-
cluded a number of "adult" pictures, some of which Playboy
owned.12 ° The defendant offered its subscribers the ability to
download more files beyond the weekly allotment from its
BBS in exchange for subscribers posting additional materials
to the BBS.'2 ' The defendant offered this exchange service in
order to make a greater number of files available for down-
loading and thereby make the service more attractive to new
customers.'22 When the defendant received new files, the files
were placed into a separate folder where a BBS employee
"briefly checked the new files to ascertain whether [they
were] 'acceptable,' meaning, not pornographic, and not bla-
tantly protected by copyright."' The employee would check
the materials before they were available for download by
other subscribers. 24
The court held that the defendant was guilty of direct
copyright infringement. 15  Hardenburgh tried to claim a
similarity to the OSP in Netcom, by arguing it was a mere
passive conduit for the infringing materials to be transmitted
to others because the subscribers posted the infringing mate-
rials on the BBS. 126 However, the Hardenburgh court distin-
guished the defendant from the OSP in Netcom since the de-
fendant did take some volitional action.127 The court held that
the defendant directly infringed by providing incentives for
subscribers to submit files in exchange for the ability to
download more files from its BBS.'28 In addition, the defen-
dant had a screening policy, where employees examined the
submitted materials for possibly infringing materials, before
118. See id. at 505.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 506.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. at 506
124. See id.
125. See id. at 512-14.
126. See id. at 509.
127. See id. at 512-13.
128. See id. at 513.
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placing them on the BBS.129 This was ruled an insufficient
policy because the defendant knew of the possible presence of
Playboy's copyrighted materials on its system, yet did not
adequately screen for them.' The court held that the defen-
dant infringed Playboy's exclusive display and distribution
rights under the 1976 Copyright Act when the defendant al-
lowed Playboy's copyrighted pictures to be uploaded, screened
(but not discarded) by employees, and downloaded by sub-
scribers.' In addition, the court found the defendant liable
for contributory copyright infringement because the defen-
dant encouraged and provided incentives for subscribers to
submit materials (i.e., substantial participation), some of
which were likely to come from Playboy (i.e., knowledge).'
The Netcom holding was also distinguished in another
case involving Playboy: Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
Webbworld, Inc.'33 Here the defendant operated a web page
offering "adult" materials to its paying subscribers.' The de-
fendant wrote a program which automatically downloaded
materials from selected "adult" newsgroups, edited the mate-
rials to remove anything but pictures, and made smaller cop-
ies (i.e., "thumbnails") of the pictures. 3 ' The program then
transmitted those pictures to computers that made the pic-
tures available to subscribers.' The pictures gathered from
the newsgroups remained on the system for approximately six
days before being deleted to make room for a new set of pic-
tures.
Upon accessing Webbworld's page, the customer had an
option of viewing the pictures available for downloading ei-
ther by viewing a "thumbnail" image, which the customer
could select to view a full size picture. 8 The Webbworld page
also included instructions about how customers could view
and download the full-size images to their personal comput-
129. See Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. at 513
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 514.
133. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex.
1997).
134. See id. at 549.
135. See id. at 549-50.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 550.
138. See id.
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139
The court held that Webbworld was guilty of direct copy-
right infringement. 4 ' Webbworld argued that it acted as a
mere conduit between its subscribers and the newsgroups
containing the infringing pictures.' Webbworld stressed
that the infringing activities would continue whether it pro-
vided access to the infringing pictures or not.'42 However, the
court held that Webbworld's service was not providing access
to the newsgroups, but rather was selling "adult" pictures. 43
Webbworld caused copies to be made of the pictures by cre-
ating its own "thumbnail" copies from the newsgroup pictures
and editing them to remove all materials other than pic-
tures. 1
44
Webbworld also argued that it did not control the content
on, or the material taken from, the newsgroups .' The court
rejected this argument because Webbworld controlled which
newsgroups its program retrieved information from. 41 In ad-
dition, the court held that Webbworld could have taken pro-
tective measures, such as manually checking the materials or
waiting until specialized software could be developed, to pre-
vent copyright-infringing materials from appearing on its web
site.1
47
B. Online Service Provider Liability Under the DMCA
Section 202 of the DMCA4 added 17 U.S.C. § 512149 to
update the Copyright Act. Section 512 clarifies the liability of
universities, ISPs, and search engines for acts of copyright in-
fringement that occur on their computer systems or as a re-
sult of providing access to the infringing materials."' Section
512 also defines the liability for copyright infringement of: (1)
139. See Webbworld, 991 F. Supp. at 550
140. See id. at 550-53.
141. See id. at 552.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See Webbworld, 991 F. Supp. at 552-53.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 553.
148. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202, 112 Stat.
2860, 2877-86 (1998).
149. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998).
150. See 144 CONG. REC. S11888 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Thurmond).
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universities that provide Internet service to their faculty and
students;"' (2) OSPs whose systems temporarily make a copy
of infringing material in transmitting or routing material to
the requestor of the material;..2 (3) OSPs that merely copy
and store infringing materials on their systems to reduce the
burden on their system when transmitting frequently re-
quested materials;" 3 and (4) services, including search en-
gines (e.g., "Yahoo!" and "Excite") that merely refer or link us-
ers to web sites that contain copyright-infringing materials.
1 4
Most relevant to this discussion, § 512 updates the existing
copyright law by clarifying an OSP's liability for copyright in-
fringement caused by third parties whose materials are
stored on the OSP's system, as well as identifying the rights
of copyright holders in such situations.'
Section 512(c) provides OSPs with a defense to possible
infringement claims so as to limit liability to only injunctive
or equitable relief."' To qualify for the protection, (1) the OSP
must not know57 or have reason to know".8 of the presence of
infringing material on its system due to a third party's acts;
(2) when an OSP acquires knowledge of the infringing mate-
rials, it must act "expeditiously" to remove the infringing ma-
terials or block access to them;"9 (3) if the OSP has the right
and ability to control the actions of the third party, it must
not financially benefit due to the presence of infringing mate-
rials;'6 (4) the OSP must also adopt and implement, as well
as notify its customers of, a policy that provides the OSP with
the ability to terminate a subscriber's account when a sub-
scriber repeatedly infringes copyrights;' (5) the OSP must,
upon the fulfillment of specialized notification procedures for
infringing materials present on its system, act "expeditiously"
to remove or block access to the infringing materials;'6 2 (6) the
OSP must designate on its web site in an area that is publicly
151. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(e).
152. See id. § 512(a).
153. See id. § 512(b).
154. See id. § 512(d).
155. See id. § 512(c).
156. See id. § 512(c)(1).
157. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i).
158. See id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
159. See id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).
160. See id. § 512(c)(1)(B).
161. See id. § 512(i)(1)(A).
162. See id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
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available an agent to receive notification from a copyright
holder, under the specified procedures described below, of in-
fringing materials present on its system;'63 and (7) the OSP
must also submit contact information for its designated agent
to the Copyright Office, which the Copyright Office will then
place in a publicly accessible directory.!"
By complying with the specialized notification proce-
dures, a copyright holder or his or her agent may notify the
OSP of copyright-infringing materials present on its system
and request that the OSP remove or block access to the in-
fringing materials.'65 The notification provided to the OSP
must be in writing'66 and include: (1) identification of the
copyrighted work(s) that are claimed to be infringed;'67 (2)
identification of the infringing material(s) sufficient to allow
the OSP to locate the infringing materials;68 (3) contact in-
formation of the copyright holder or his or her agent; 9 (4) a
statement that the notifying party has a good faith belief that
the materials claimed to be infringing its use are not author-
ized by the copyright holder, his/her agent, or the law; 70 (5) a
statement that the notification information is accurate and
that, under the penalty of perjury, the notifying party is
authorized to take such action; 7' and (6) a physical or elec-
tronic signature of a person authorized to enforce the rights of
the copyright holder.
17
Pursuant to § 512(g), an OSP who removes allegedly in-
fringing material on its system placed there by one of its sub-
scribers, as a result of the notification procedure, is protected
from liability attributed to the subscriber if it complies with a
specified procedure.7 3 Under the procedure, (1) the OSP must
take reasonable steps to notify the subscriber that the alleg-
edly infringing material has been removed or access to it has
been blocked; 74 (2) if the OSP receives a written counter-
163. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2).
164. See id.
165. See id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
166. See id. § 512(c)(3)(A).
167. See id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii).
168. See id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).
169. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iv).
170. See id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v).
171. See id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi).
172. See id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i).
173. See id. § 512(g)(1).
174. See id. § 512(g)(2)(A).
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notification. 5 from the subscriber which (a) identifies the ma-
terial that was removed or disabled and its location before
being removed or disabled,176 (b) states that the subscriber
believes in good faith that the material was removed or
blocked by "mistake or misidentification of the material to be
removed or disabled,"'77 (c) states that the subscriber subjects
himself or herself to personal jurisdiction of a federal district
court,'78 and (d) has a physical or electronic signature of the
subscriber;7 9 (3) the OSP must contact the notifying party in-
forming it that the materials will be replaced or access rein-
stated after ten working days;' ° and (4) the OSP must then
replace or reinstate access to the allegedly infringing materi-
als unless notified that a suit has been brought by the noti-
fying party to stop the subscriber from engaging in copyright-
infringing action on the OSP's system.'
Under § 512(h), a copyright holder may also serve the
OSP with a subpoena requesting the identity of the alleged
copyright infringer.8 ' A copyright holder may obtain this
subpoena from a federal district court 83 upon presentation of
a copy of the OSP notification of allegedly infringing materi-
als present on the OSP's system"' and a statement that the
information requested will be used only for protection of
rights under the Copyright Act.'85 Upon proper service of the
subpoena and the notification, the OSP must disclose the in-
formation requested by the subpoena to the copyright holder
or his or her agent.'
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The DMCA, specifically the addition of 17 U.S.C. § 512,187
codifies the case law regarding the liability of OSPs for copy-
right infringement when third parties place infringing mate-
175. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3).
176. See id. § 512(g)(3)(B).
177. Id. § 512(g)(3)(C).
178. See id. § 512(g)(3)(D).
179. See id. § 512(g)(3)(A).
180. See id. § 512(g)(2)(B).
181. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(C).
182. See id. § 512(h).
183. See id. § 512(h)(1).
184. See id. § 512(h)(2)(A).
185. See id. § 512(h)(2)(C).
186. See id. § 512(h)(5).
187. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
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rials on the service provider's computer system. Through the
DMCA, Congress also defines the liability of online service
providers for copyright infringement under other circum-
stances, such as universities that provide Internet access to
their students and faculty. 88 Although copyright holders
were consulted in the congressional proceedings and drafting
of the DMCA,'89 the question remains whether copyright
holders are adequately protected in light of the changes made
to the holdings under the case law. In addition, questions
arise as to whether additional legislation is required to ade-
quately protect copyright holders.
IV. ANALYSIS
In order to explore the changes made to the case law by
the adoption of the DMCA and specifically the addition of 17
U.S.C. § 512,190 consider the following hypothetical situation.
Service Unlimited' is an online service provider that
gives its subscribers an e-mail account and access to the
Internet for a fixed monthly fee. In addition to e-mail and
Internet access, Service Unlimited provides its subscribers
with the option of creating a personal web site for a nominal
setup fee and a flat monthly rate. Within its terms and con-
ditions of service, to which all subscribers must agree, Service
Unlimited retains the right and ability to terminate the serv-
ice of subscribers who consistently commit copyright viola-
tions. The Service Unlimited web site notifies interested peo-
ple of its designated agent for the notification process.
Service Unlimited also notifies the Copyright Office of its
agent.
Dan Defendant, a subscriber of Service Unlimited's serv-
ices, decides to create his own web site. Dan is a big sports
fan and decides to devote his personal web page to the teams
and the sports he zealously follows. In order to make his web
page more attractive, he decides to put pictures of various
star athletes as well as professional team insignias on his
page. The pictures and insignias are available to download
188. See id. § 512(e).
189. See 144 CONG. REC. H10620 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Goodlatte).
190. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
191. Service Unlimited is a fictional OSP that will be used throughout the
analysis to illustrate an OSP's liability under case law. See infra Part IV.A-B.
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by any visitor to Dan's web page. Dan obtains the materials
for his web site by searching various sports-related news-
groups for pictures of athletes. In addition, Dan acquires the
team insignias and individual athlete photographs by down-
loading the images from the web sites of various professional
teams. He also includes short video clips of portions of actual
games, also downloaded from the team web sites.
Dan transmits his web page to the Service Unlimited
computer through a mostly automated process. First, Dan
designs his web page on his personal computer using his
Service Unlimited Internet service to download pictures,
video clips, and team insignias from newsgroups and profes-
sional sports teams' web pages. Second, Dan connects to the
Service Unlimited system via modem on his personal com-
puter. Finally, through an automatic program written by
Service Unlimited, a copy of the web page is created on the
Service Unlimited computer network. After the process is
complete, visitors are able to access Dan's web site by re-
questing a copy of the web page and by specifying its location
on the Service Unlimited computer.
Dan Defendant's web page contains infringing materials.
Some of the pictures Dan took from newsgroups and placed
on his web site were originally taken from copyrighted sports
magazines and individual copyrights are held on the pictures
themselves. In addition, Dan took the copyrighted team logos
and video clips directly from the team web sites.
Service Unlimited had no knowledge of Dan's copyright
infringement. When notified by the copyright holders of the
infringing materials present on Dan's web site, Service Un-
limited acted to block access to Dan's page.
A. Result Under Case Law
1. Direct Copyright Infringement
If a copyright holder brings an action for direct copyright
infringement against Service Unlimited, the action would
most likely fail under current case law.192 Using the Netcom
192. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D.
Tex. 1997); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503
(N.D. Ohio 1997); Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs.,
983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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analysis,'93 the copyright holder could not show direct copy-
right infringement against Service Unlimited due to a lack of
volitional action on the part of Service Unlimited.
A copyright holder could establish that a copy of the
copyrighted work had been made. The process of copying ma-
terials from Dan's personal computer onto the Service Un-
limited web page satisfied the copying requirement. Under
MAI Systems,"" a physical copy is not required and, as here, a
copy made into the memory of a computer is enough to trigger
a copyright violation.9
As the Netcom court held, the copyright holder is not re-
quired to show an intent to infringe a copyright in order to
merit a direct copyright infringement violation.'96 Instead,
only some volitional action by the accused infringer to create
the copy is needed. 97 As in Netcom, there is no volitional ac-
tion on the part of the online service provider in this hypo-
thetical. A software program automatically copied Dan's web
page on the Service Unlimited system without any editing or
alteration. In addition, the infringing web page was also
transferred to the visitor's computer through an automated
process. In neither situation does Service Unlimited take any
volitional action nor violate the copyright holder's rights.
Rather, Service Unlimited acts as a mere storage space and
conduit in which the infringing materials are spread.
Service Unlimited's actions were analogous to Marobie,'98
where the service provider had a web site with infringing ma-
terials located on its network."' The court in Marobie held
that the OSP was not liable for direct copyright infringement
because it did nothing more than provide access to the Inter-
net.00 Similarly, Service Unlimited only provided a conduit
through which Dan was able to spread his copyright-
infringing materials.
A court would also distinguish the instant hypothetical
193. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1361.
194. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
195. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368-71.
196. See id. at 1367.
197. See id.
198. See Marobie-FL, Inc. v National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F.
Supp. 1167, 1176-78 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
199. See id. at 1178.
200. See id. at 1176-78.
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from Webbworld, °' where the court held that because
Webbworld could control the searched newsgroups and could
take measures to prevent copyright-infringing materials from
becoming available on the BBS, it was more than a mere con-
duit for the infringing materials to reach the Internet. 2 Al-
though Service Unlimited created the software that copied
Dan's web page onto its server, Service Unlimited had no per-
sonal control over the content that a third party placed on the
web page. Service Unlimited was merely selling access to the
Internet, rather than selling access to the content on Dan's
web site. Also, Service Unlimited did not edit or alter the ma-
terial when copying the web page onto its computer system.
The court would also distinguish the situation from
Hardenburgh,0 2 where the court held that direct copyright in-
fringement occurred because the defendant provided incen-
tives for subscribers to submit infringing materials and had a
program in place to search for copyright-infringing materi-
als.0 4 Service Unlimited did not provide incentives for sub-
mitting or placing possible copyright-infringing materials on
its computer network. Further, Service Unlimited had no
program or policy in place to monitor, and thereby control,
the content of the web sites located on its system. Without
the incentive or monitoring plan, the Service Unlimited case
is distinguishable from Hardenburgh.
2. Contributory Copyright Infringement
Under case law, a plaintiff must show the defendant's
knowledge concerning the presence of infringing materials on
the web site and substantial participation in the infringing
activity to demonstrate contributory copyright infringe-
ment.0 5 In Netcom, the court held that where an OSP has
reasonable uncertainty regarding the validity of a claim of
copyright infringement, the fact that the service provider al-
lowed the allegedly infringing materials to remain on the sys-
201. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex.
1997).
202. See id. at 552-53.
203. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D.
Ohio 1997).
204. See id. at 513-14.
205. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1375-77 (N.D.
Cal. 1995).
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tem did not satisfy the knowledge requirement.2"6 Service
Unlimited, by immediately blocking access to Dan's web site,
avoids satisfying the knowledge requirement since it blocked
access to the materials after acquiring knowledge of the exis-
tence of possibly infringing materials on its computer net-
work. Service Unlimited's actions demonstrate a lack of
knowledge of Dan Defendant's copyright infringement. This
contrasts with the OSP's actions in Netcom, where a question
remained whether Netcom had reasonable doubt regarding
the legitimacy of the copyright holder's claim when it allowed
the infringing materials to remain on its computer network.2 °7
In addition, the copyright holders would be unable to
satisfy the second requirement of contributory copyright in-
fringement: substantial participation in the infringing activ-
ity.208 Netcom held that allowing infringing materials to re-
main on an OSP's computer network after acquiring
knowledge of the presence of such infringing materials would
satisfy the substantial participation requirement for contribu-
tory copyright infringement.29  Even if Service Unlimited
were found to have had knowledge of the infringing activity,
this second requirement would not be satisfied because Serv-
ice Unlimited blocked access to Dan's web page as soon as it
received notification.
3. Vicarious Copyright Infringement
In order to establish a claim for vicarious copyright in-
fringement, a plaintiff needs to show (1) that the OSP had the
right and ability to control the infringing materials, and (2)
that it gained a direct financial benefit from the infringing ac-
tivity. 10 The Netcom court allowed the possibility that the
first element could be met through a policy where the OSP re-
tains the right to take remedial actions against the subscriber
for infringing activities. 1' In the hypothetical, Service Un-
limited's retention of the ability to terminate the Internet
service of a subscriber may meet the "right and ability to con-
trol" requirement for vicarious copyright infringement.
206. See id. at 1374.
207. See id. at 1374-75.
208. See id. at 1375.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 1375-77.
211. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376.
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However, the vicarious copyright infringement action
would likely fail under the second requirement, that the OSP
receive some direct financial benefit from the infringing ac-
tivity.212 A copyright holder in the hypothetical could argue
that the direct financial benefit would be the additional reve-
nue that Service Unlimited receives for providing Dan's web
page with access to the Internet. Service Unlimited would
analogize its situation to Marobie,212 where the court held that
an OSP that only receives an initial setup fee and a flat
monthly rate for service did not meet the direct financial
benefit requirement."4 The Marobie court found that to meet
the requirement the OSP would have to receive some addi-
tional financial benefit beyond just a mere setup fee and a flat
rate.2"' Here, Service Unlimited would argue that although it
received a nominal setup fee in addition to the fee it received
for Internet access, like the Marobie OSP, it did not receive
any other financial benefit from the presence of infringing
materials on its computer system.
B. Result Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Under the DMCA, an OSP that fulfills the requirements
under § 512(c)216 will be relieved from all monetary damages
and subject to only limited injunctive relief for direct, con-
tributory, and vicarious copyright infringement."7 Service
Unlimited's actions satisfy § 512(c) and thus its liability is
limited.
Service Unlimited designated an agent to receive notifi-
cations of possibly infringing materials, posted its agent's
identity on its web site,2 18 and notified the Copyright Office of
its agent's identity. ' Service Unlimited also adopted a policy
of terminating the Internet service of subscribers who repeat-
edly commit acts of copyright infringement and notified its
subscribers of this policy. 20 By following these procedures,
212. See id. at 1376-77.
213. Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F. Supp.
1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
214. See id. at 1179.
215. See id.
216. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (1998).
217. See id.
218. See id. § 512(c)(2).
219. See id.
220. See id. § 512(i)(1)(A).
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Service Unlimited has fulfilled the requirements required to
receive limited liability.
Service Unlimited has also fulfilled the specific require-
ments under § 512(c) for immunity from monetary relief or
limited injunctive relief for copyright infringement. In order
to qualify for this limited liability, an OSP must comply with
three major requirements. First, Service Unlimited must
have no actual..1 or constructive2 knowledge of the infringing
activity on Dan's web site. Service Unlimited did not have
knowledge of Dan's infringing activities because it did not
control the content of what was placed on Dan's web site, nor
did it alter the content when copying onto the Service Unlim-
ited computer network.
Second, Service Unlimited must not draw a direct finan-
cial benefit from the infringing materials located on its com-
puter network.2  As discussed above, 4 Service Unlimited did
not receive any financial benefit from the infringing materi-
als. Service Unlimited only received fees for monthly Inter-
net access, the initial set-up, and a flat monthly rate for the
web page service.
Finally, assuming that the copyright holder follows the
correct notification procedures,2 2 5 after Service Unlimited re-
ceives the notification it must act quickly to remove or block
access to the allegedly infringing works.226 In the hypotheti-
cal, Service Unlimited blocked access to Dan's web site upon
receiving notification of the infringing materials. Therefore,
Service Unlimited satisfied all the conditions of § 512. As a
result, Service Unlimited is immune from monetary relief and
limited to only injunctive relief for direct, contributory, or vi-
carious copyright liability due to the infringing actions of a
third party.
C. Comparison
Under both case law and the DMCA, Service Unlimited
would most likely not be held liable for monetary damages for
copyright infringement. Although the two systems for deter-
221. See id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i).
222. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
223. See id. § 512(c)(1)(B).
224. See supra Part IV.A.3.
225. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3).
226. See id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
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mining the copyright infringement liability of OSPs for third
party acts seem very different on their face, when compared
closely, they are quite similar.22 '
In order to qualify for protection from all monetary relief
and be subject only to limited injunctive relief under the
DMCA, an OSP must comply with all of the requirements of
§ 512(c)."2 8 These requirements do not depart significantly
from the factors courts have used to avoid copyright in-
fringement liability under the common law. In order for an
OSP to be shielded under both case law and the DMCA, it
must serve as a mere passive conduit in which a third party's
copyright-infringing materials are allowed to reach the Inter-
net.2 '9 Further, both systems require that an OSP have no ac-
tual or constructive knowledge that infringing materials ap-
pear on its system.2 3 By requiring immediate removal or
blocking of the infringing material upon notification,' 3' the
DMCA aligns with the knowledge22 and substantial partici-
pation factors2 2 for no contributory copyright infringement li-
ability under the common law. Finally, the DMCA's require-
ment that the OSP receive no financial benefit from the
infringing materials when retaining the right and ability to
control its member's conduct2. 4 mirrors the "no direct financial
benefit" 35 and "right and ability to control" the infringing ac-
tions requirements. under the case law.
In satisfying all the requirements under the DMCA, an
OSP will probably not be liable for copyright infringement
under any of the common law theories for copyright infringe-
ment. Although the DMCA seems, on its face, to give OSPs
almost complete immunity from copyright infringement li-
ability for a third party's actions, it does not drastically de-
part from the theories for an OSP's derivative copyright in-
fringement liability under case law.
227. See supra Part JV.A-B.
228. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
229. See supra Part IV.A.1 and Part IV.B.
230. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A).
231. See id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
232. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373-75 (N.D.
Cal. 1995).
233. See id. at 1375.
234. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).
235. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376.
236. See id. at 1375.
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V. PROPOSAL
The amendment to the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512,
appears to be a sufficient solution to define the liability of
OSPs for a third party's copyright-infringing actions and
seems mainly to codify the common law.237 Prior to the adop-
tion of the DMCA, case law regarding the liability of OSPs
was derived solely from federal district court decisions. Be-
cause the case law had not faced appellate scrutiny and was
therefore still subject to reversal, the OSPs sought congres-
sional action to clarify their liability for a third party's copy-
right-infringing actions. 39
In providing this clarification, Congress codified the
common law regarding OSP liability for the copyright-
infringing actions of a third party. However, Congress also
sought to protect the incentives provided by the intellectual
property system to allow people to create and express their
ideas.24° In balancing these equally important interests, Con-
gress ensured that the copyright holder's rights were ade-
quately protected by federal statute and, therefore, no further
amendments are required to provide additional protections.
Although the DMCA (specifically § 5122"') limits the li-
ability of OSPs for the acts of third parties, it does not affect
the ability of a copyright holder to bring suit against a third
party directly responsible for placing infringing materials on
the Internet. While often removing the "deep pocket" that the
copyright holder could sue for copyright infringement, the
DMCA provides an alternate source through a specialized
procedure whereby the copyright holder is able to get a sub-
poena from the court requiring an OSP to release information
about its subscribers.242 Through the subpoena process, the
copyright holder is able to establish the identity of the person
actually placing the infringing materials on the OSP's com-
237. See supra Part IV.
238. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D.
Tex. 1997); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503
(N.D. Ohio 1997); Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs.,
983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1361.
239. See 144 CONG. REC. H7095 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Goodlatte).
240. See 144 CONG. REC. H10620 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Goodlatte).
241. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (1998).
242. See id. § 512(h).
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puter network.24 This power enhances a copyright holder's
ability to bring suit directly against the party infringing its
copyright.
In addition, an OSP must comply with all of the require-
ments of § 512(c) in order to be eligible for protection under
the DMCA.2  Otherwise, an OSP is still liable under the
common law for copyright infringement. If an OSP complies
with all of the requirements of § 512(c), then it will not be li-
able under the common law as well for copyright infringe-
ment.
2 45
The copyright holder is also protected under the special-
ized notification procedure for removal or blocking of the in-
fringing materials.246 Under the DMCA, an OSP seeking pro-
tection must remove or block access to the infringing
materials after receiving notification of the presence of alleg-
edly copyright-infringing materials on its computer net-
work.247 Under this procedure, the copyright holder is able to
have an OSP prevent others from further accessing the in-
fringing materials. This procedure also prevents the further
spread of the infringing materials and thereby limits the
damage done by such dissemination.
The Act also protects the alleged infringer through the
"put back" procedure,248 in which access to the allegedly in-
fringing material can be restored under appropriate circum-
stances.2 49 The procedure is designed to protect those who be-
lieve that their materials have been mistakenly removed or
blocked by their service provider. To have their materials re-
placed, an alleged infringer sends a counter-notification to an
OSP certifying that he or she believes the allegedly infringing
materials were removed by mistake. 5 ° The OSP must replace
the materials unless the copyright holder brings suit in fed-
eral court.25' By instituting this procedure, the copyright
holder is protected from having the infringing materials
placed on the Internet because the alleged infringer agrees to
243. See id.
244. See H.R. REP. 105-551(11), at 56 (1998).
245. See supra Part IV.
246. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C).
247. See id.
248. See id. § 512(g).
249. See id. § 512(g)(2)(B).
250. See id. § 512(g)(3).
251. See id.
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subject itself to a district court's personal jurisdiction2 in the
event of a copyright infringement suit.
When drafting the DMCA, Congress took into considera-
tion the rights and interests of all relevant parties: for OSPs,
it provided clarification of their liability for copyright in-
fringement under certain conditions;. 8 for copyright holders,
it provided a method for obtaining relief for their injuries due
to copyright infringement by others;254 and for alleged infring-
ers, it provided a method for replacing materials they believe
were mistakenly identified as infringing.' In adopting the
DMCA, Congress did not subordinate the copyright holders'
rights in favor of the OSPs'. The DMCA provided methods256
for holding liable the parties actually responsible for dissemi-
nating infringing materials on the Internet and for having the
infringing materials removed or having access to them
blocked.257 In sum, since Congress fairly balanced the com-
peting interests involved in situations like the Service Un-
limited hypothetical, further legislation is not required in or-
der to protect the rights of copyright holders.
VI. CONCLUSION
In passing the DMCA, Congress sought to update the
copyright law to address changes in technology. Within the
DMCA, Congress clarified the copyright infringement liability
for online service providers whose computer systems are used
by third parties to store or route copyright-infringing mate-
rial. 8 In defining the limits of an OSP's liability, Congress
did not subordinate the copyright holder's rights to the OSP's,
but instead installed procedures to protect those rights.259
Therefore, additional legislation is not needed to protect copy-
right holders.
Further legislation is not required because in defining
the limits on liability of OSPs for acts of copyright infringe-
ment caused by third parties, the DMCA provides no protec-
252. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3)(C).
253. See id. § 512(c).
254. See id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii), (c)(1)(C), (g)(3)(C), (h).
255. See id. § 512(g).
256. See id. § 512(g)(3)(C), (h).
257. See id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii), (C).
258. See 144 CONG. REC. S11888 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (Statement of Sen.
Thurmond).
259. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii), (c)(1)(C), (g)(3)(C), (h).
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tion greater than what an OSP would face under the common
law. 6' The DMCA merely sets out procedures the OSP must
implement to prevent liability for copyright infringement.261
In order to qualify for DMCA protection, an OSP must
comply with all of the requirements set forth by the Act.262 If
an OSP does not comply with all of the requirements of the
Act, then it is not eligible for protection under the Act and its
liability is governed by the case law.263
The DMCA also does not alter the right of a copyright
holder to sue the copyright infringer who actually places the
allegedly infringing materials on the Internet.264 The DMCA
only removes the "deep pocket" of an OSP from liability under
certain conditions.265 Further, the DMCA grants subpoena
power to the copyright holder whereby the identity of the ac-
tual infringer can be obtained.66 This procedure demon-
strates how Congress acted to protect copyright holders'
rights by providing them with a means to obtain relief
against copyright infringers through the courts. 67
The DMCA also provides procedures by which a copyright
holder can have a service provider remove or block access to
the allegedly infringing materials. 6 ' By blocking or removing
allegedly infringing information, a copyright holder may pre-
vent the material from spreading any further, thereby limit-
ing the damage from the dissemination of the materials.
Finally, the DMCA protects the rights of an alleged copy-
right infringer who believes that his or her materials have
been confused or mistaken as infringing. The Act allows the
alleged infringer to have access to the materials reinstated.269
However, under this "put back" procedure, the DMCA further
protects the rights of a copyright holder by subjecting the al-
leged copyright infringer to personal jurisdiction in a U.S.
district court.270
260. See supra Part IV.C.
261. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
262. See H.R. REP. 105-551(11) at 56 (1998).
263. See id..
264. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 512.
265. See id.
266. See id. § 512(g)(3)(C), (h).
267. See id.
268. See id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii), (c)(1)(C).
269. See id. § 512(g).
270. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3)(D).
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In the two-year process 7' that led to the DMCA, Congress
has done an admirable job in balancing the interests of all
relevant parties.272 By involving all of the interested parties
in the drafting of the legislation, Congress helped to ensure
that the rights of all of the parties were protected. Therefore,
because of the fairness of the DMCA in defining the rights
and liabilities of the parties, further legislation is not needed
to protect the rights of copyright holders.
271. See 144 CONG. REC. H10620 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Goodlatte).
272. See id.
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